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Highlights
- Cross-border investment projects having a European interest 
are currently undertaken country by country with insufficient 
cooperation between all actors impacted by such a project. The 
asymmetry of cost allocation and benefit distribution of cross-
border infrastructure plus the presence of economic externali-
ties have lead to a suboptimal situation at the EU level.
- A cost-benefit analysis would be an interesting tool to enhance 
the scope of studies of cross-border investments. A cost-benefit 
analysis is more suitable for undertaking a country to country 
cross-border analysis. An extra complexity arises when one 
wants to consider a full EU infrastructure package.
- TSOs should invest the congestion rents generated in cross-bor-
der trade or lose them (“invest it or lose it”). TSOs not interested 
into cross-border efficient investment projects should transfer 
the congestion rents to a “European Interconnection Fund” to 
finance other EU relevant interconnection projects. 
- The existing “Inter-TSO Compensation” mechanism should be 
either replaced or suplemented by an ex ante instrument based 
on a cost-benefit analysis. This welcome upgrade should explic-
itly take into account the economic externalities of the new in-
vestment projects. 
- ACER could play a more powerful role in approving investment 
plans. EU legislation could be revisited to permit this. An in-
teresting alternative to the today’s European system operation 
frame would be to create an EU “Independent System Operator” 
(EU-ISO) which would have access to the relevant network and 
operation information that ACER does not get. That EU ISO 
could play an active role in the studies contributing to European 
cross-border infrastructure planning.
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Background
The European Union is engaged in a process of market inte-
gration over a long period. Cross-border energy infrastructure 
investments should play a key role in reaching this objective. 
However, cross-border investment projects having a European 
interest are currently undertaken only country by country 
with an insufficient cooperation between actors involved in 
such a project. Beside the lack of cooperation, the asymmetries 
of cost allocation and of benefit distribution of cross-border 
infrastructure plus the presence of economic externalities have 
lead to a suboptimal situation at the EU level.
Problem Identification
Investing in cross-border lines in well-interconnected electric-
ity systems can benefit the origin country by reducing its con-
gestion costs as well as to third party countries by increasing 
their power trade. Some players in certain countries may then 
have significant benefits without taking a proportionate part 
in the costs incurred by the investment in the origin country. 
It leads to the significant problem of “free-riding”. The asym-
metric allocation of costs and benefit distribution calls for a 
bettter coordination of stakeholders across borders for many 
significant investments in cross-border lines. 
Large-scale renewable energy is adding more challenges. Not 
only a stronger coordination is required between European 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) and National Regu-
lators authorities (NRAs), but other stakeholders are also 
concerned such as renewable energy developers and in some 
cases actors from outside the EU (e.g. North Africa). Indeed, 
the ongoing smartening up of the grid gives rise to complex 
multilateral network externalities induced by the asymmetric 
allocation of innovation’s risks and gains. 
In the gas sector, several infrastructure investment projects 
are also lacking the right incentive to stimulate cooperation 
between impacted stakeholders and are then facing an inef-
ficient cost allocation problem. Multiple stakeholders already 
take part in the investment decision process. Gas TSOs are key 
players having public or private status whith different respon-
sibilities in the decision process. The transmission demand 
side –the shippers- may also take part (notably with “open sea-
sons”) and in some cases, national governments and regula-
tors play a direct and active role. Given this colourful context a 
thoughtful cooperation is still strongly required. 
The gas 10 Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) to 
be issued in 2013 should help to increase knowledge and to 
streamline views about networks needs and issues. It willl 
however lack a definition of how costs should be allocated and 
to whom. Many stakeholders could pay for the new infrastruc-
ture if the right conditions are put in place. For instance, gas 
producers would be inclined to pay if they can get exclusive 
rights on infrastructure. TSOs could pay to supply national 
end users while being not allowed by their NRAs to bear cross-
border costs for purely foreign needs. Considering the conti-
nental scope of the European gas market, the EU itself could 
participate to the infrastructure cost recovery. However, this 
could increase political interference with the market play. 
Anyhow the benefiting consumers and / or suppliers should 
pay for any infrastructure that feeds them. The challenge is 
that they may prefer to not pay today while expecting some-
body else to bear the investment, so as to get later access to this 
new capacity on a more flexible and cheaper basis. We do not 
find there are conditions for a “one size fits all” perfect frame.
Revisiting Cross-Border Investment Planning Tools 
Planning tools are mainly considered at the national level. 
Advanced planning of projects having a European interest is 
conceived of as being parallel to regional initiatives. The roof 
of the European planning process is the TYNDP introduced 
by the Third Legislative package. It aims at developing long 
term and top-down scenarios for conceiving new transmis-
sion assets. While it could give a benchmark for a planning 
integrating EU climate and energy policy targets “20-20-20”, 
it is not clear how the requirement of increasing coordination 
of stakeholders across borders is addressed. Only TSOs and 
NRAs are explicitly involved in the planning process. Rather, 
it is not conceived to deal with grid smartening objectives. For 
instance, the involvement of renewable energy developers is 
not clearly envisaged. Anyhow, since the TYNDP has to be is-
sued in 2012 for electricity and 2013 for gas, it is only a very 
first step to meet the EU energy policy targets by 2050. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) would be an interesting tool to 
enhance the planning of cross-border infrastructure invest-
ments. It relies on evaluating ex ante the costs and the benefits 
of investment projects with consideration of productive, alloc-
The TYNDP should be supplemented by a top-down 
master plan looking 30 years ahead which is a bridge 
to reach 2050
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ative and dynamic efficiency. To apply it to investment plan-
ning in the whole EU as it can be in isolated Member States, 
the first challenge is to define the appropriate jurisdictions and 
parties affected in each of the related countries. 
To properly take into account the technical and economic ex-
ternalities that could arise from cross-border investment pro-
jects, the CBA analysis should be “granular” instead of “global”. 
It has to investigate what the likely welfare changes are among 
various stakeholder groups. Furthermore, consumers’ willing-
ness to pay should be taken into account and key stakeholders 
should be clearly identified as units of analysis to avoid pre-
dictable deadlocks and political blockage. 
 
Revisiting Existing Cost Recovery Tools
To recover the cost of maintaining infrastructure and the cost 
of the new invested cross-border capacity, several cost recov-
ery tools have been used.  
Regulated Tariffs: At the national level, regulated transmis-
sion tariffs recover the TSO’s cost of investment in intercon-
nection capacity. It could be an appropriate tool for increas-
ing projects of national interest. However within this scheme, 
there is no appropriate incentive to enhance efficient cross-
border infrastructure, unless those would impact the local sys-
tem by reducing internal congestion costs. 
  
Congestion Rents: when a market-based allocation of capac-
ity is used, TSOs receive congestion rents that are allowed to be 
used to guarantee the availability of the allocated capacity, in-
crease interconnection capacity, or reduce the regulated tariff 
inside the country. In practice however, these rents are mainly 
allocated to tariff reduction and not to finance EU intercon-
nection enhancement.
 
Inter-TSO Compensation (ITC): The ITC mechanism, which 
only exists in electricity, defines compensation rules for costs 
incurred by TSOs as a result of cross-border flows. This com-
pensation scheme however operates a reallocation of the costs 
of existing infrastructure (such as losses) only ex-post. It is 
then designed only to deal with existing infrastructure, which 
had not been conceived to serve an EU internal market but 
separated national trade zones. ITC totally lacks an appropri-
ate scheme to incentivize investment in a new infrastructure 
which would benefit several national zones: it does not consid-
er ex ante costs and benefits of new pieces of infrastructures.
 
 
EU Public Funding: EU funding has been used to support 
interconnector investments for certain projects of European 
interest. EU funding covers for example the Trans-European 
Network Pro¬gram, the Euro¬pean Economic Recovery Pro-
gram and the European Investment Bank Projects. However, 
until recently, available funds through the Trans-European 
Network process have very limited and only used to finance 
feasibility studies. They therefore had a marginal impact in 
comparison to the total budget needed for the implementation 
of an interconnection project.
 
A cost-benefit analysis would be suitable to undertake 
a country by country cross-border investment planning 
analysis. An extra complexity arises when one wants to 
consider a full EU infrastructure package.
A good option is to turn the national incentive regulation 
scheme toward cross-border cooperation. An advanced 
scheme could include risk-adapted rates of return for 
investments of European interest. A minimum degree 
of harmonization across countries should however be 
ensured to create a kind of “EU level playing field”. 
ITC should be either replaced or supplemented by 
a new ex ante EU instrument based on a renewed 
cost-benefit analysis. Any upgrade should explicitly 
take into account the externalities generated by the 
interconnection investments. 
The EU could have a significant public fund, to be 
financed by Members States contributions, via the 
general EU budget or an EU transmission stamp. 
In spite of the risk of political interference with the 
market play, these funds could bring support to 
interconnection investments that yield too strong EU 
positive externalities at the country level. They should 
be dedicated to projects that market mechanisms 
cannot deliver given these externalities’ constraints. 
TSOs should have to invest these rents in cross-border 
enhancement or lose them. TSOs not interested in 
undertaking efficient investment projects would 
have to transfer the congestion rents to a “European 
Interconnection Fund” to finance other interconnection 
projects of European interest. 
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Governance Process
The needed investment in cross-border infrastructures is suf-
fering from a lack of cooperation among stakeholders across 
Member States borders. Till today most of the coordination 
between the TSOs and with the other stakeholders for cross-
border issues has been voluntary arrangements permitted by 
the existing national allocations of powers and of incentives. 
The issue there to go ahead with projects of European interest 
is the governance to be put in place.  
First, there is still a key role to play by NRAs to deal with the 
lack of coordination among them as well as between TSOs (or 
DSOs) and generation developers contributing to large-scale 
renewable energy integration. NRAs should have a clearer and 
more efficient role in the planning process and should be able 
to check whether the planning of TSOs (DSOs) reasonably 
meets EU interest. 
Second, ACER should play a more powerful role in assessing 
investment plans from the European interest point of view. EU 
legislation could be revisited to provide this. The process could 
be to allow ENTSO-E or some regional bodies to propose pri-
ority projects based on some predefined cost-benefit criteria. 
ACER then could intervene to assess such projects and guaran-
tee their European interest. It could also intervene in the cost 
allocation process when strong externalities arise and be the 
manager of a new European compensation scheme, if applied. 
Third, an interesting alternative to the existing EU TSO
industry structure would be to create an EU Independent Sys-
tem Operator (EU-ISO). It would have access to relevant net-
work and operation information that ACER does not get. This 
EU ISO could play an active role in cross-border infrastructure 
analysis. The national TSOs would act in such a new frame-
work as service providers or as projects developers implement-
ing the EU ISO program while not making the cross-border 
infrastructure analysis by themselves. The independence of the 
ISO would ensure transparency and neutrality vis-a-vis exist-
ing local interest groups as well as welfare maximization in the 
European interest, without requiring European TSOs to merge 
which are legitimate business units and state or private share-
holders properties.
In regard to the gas sector, an EU-wide planning approach is 
not likely to lead to fast or efficient decisions. An improvement 
could however be to establish common platforms, developed 
from existing open season processes. These platforms would 
allow interested parties to reserve long term capacity on cor-
ridors and the TSOs to offer competing capacity development 
projects.
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